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2. If a portion of the bonds are declared invalid, plain-
tiff and appellant should have judgment for all bonds not 
in excess of the constitutional maximum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOSED BY ARTICLE XIV, SEC-
TION 3, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, WAS NOT EXCEEDED. 
1. The debt was valid when created; subsequent ex-
penditures could not invalidate it. The debt may be floated 
from the year in which incurred to a subsequent year or 
years. 
The respondent, Spring City, having elected to rely 
solely upon the provisions of Section 3, Article XIV, of 
the Utah State Constitution to conclude the uncon-
stitutionality of the disputed bond issue, the appellant 
in its reply addresses itself solely to that proposition, 
and as to other issues upon which this appeal is based, 
appellant will rely upon its arguments in the original 
appeal brief. 
In asserting the validity of the bonds under Section 
3 of Article XIV the appellant maintains that as of Janu-
ary 15, 1948, the time the obligation of Spring City was 
created and assumed, the debt was valid and constitution-
al because potential current revenues had not been ex-
pended or appropriated. Kespondent at page 9 of his 
brief states that there is no evidence before the court t ha t^ 
the 1948 expenditures of Spring City were not regular 
operating expenses. With respondent's position in respect 
thereto we must necessarily take issue particularly in 
light of the cases and conclusions in the exhaustive note 
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in A.L.R. Vol. 159, which at page 1263 says: 
"The rule appears to be well settled that when 
a municipality * * * has created a contractual 
indebtedness which at the time of its creation is 
not in excess of the amount which it may reach 
under the constitutional limit of taxation or which 
may reasonably be anticipated, the indebtedness 
cannot thereafter be invalidated by the govern-
mental subdivision by making expenditures for 
other purposes in excess of its revenue for the 
year." 
Numerous cases therein cited uphold that theory. 
In Carl B. Miller Tractor Company v. Hope, 218 Iowa 
1235, 257 N.W. 312, it is said: 
"It seems certain that the limit of valid 
expenditure is reached when the note or collectible 
revenue is equaled and from then on all expendi-
tures are within the ban of the statute. * * * It 
seems certain that if expenditures during any 
year were in excess of collectible revenues, the 
county auditor could not go back in a year and 
select certain items for rejection and thus reach 
a position in which obligations subsequently in-
curred could validly be paid and the prior items 
selected for rejection be invalidated * * *." 
Another important case cited, Buxton S. Stationery 
Company v. Craig County, 53 Okla. 65,155 P. 215, states: 
"An ordinary debtor may incur indebtedness 
in excess of his ability to pay and he may pay 
debts in such order as he chooses; but a county 
cannot incur valid obligations exceeding in any 
one year the income and revenue provided for 
such year * * * but it is far from being a matter 
of indifference if invalid claims founded upon 
void contracts are paid before valid claims found-
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ed upon valid contracts. Parties entering into 
contracts with a county are bound to take notice 
of constitutional limitations and to ascertain as 
to what extent the revenues have been appro-
priated to existing liability; but they are not 
bound to anticipate and no amount of prudence 
or foresight would enable them to foresee that 
illegal claims would be incurred by officers willing 
to violate the constitution." 
The note of the editor goes on to say : 
"It seems to be a general rule that a provision 
against a governmental subdivision exceeding in 
any year its current revenue does not prevent it 
from paying a claim out of the revenue of a year 
subsequent to that in which it was incurred, if 
the contract on which the claim is based was valid 
when it was made." 
In Nelson County Fiscal Ct. v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 
199,194 S.W. 323, the court said: 
"After a particular debt has been incurred, 
the county cannot incur other debts for current 
expenses not indispensably necessary to the main-
tenance of the county government, and include 
such subsequent debts in its estimated liabilities 
for the purpose of defeating the prior debt in 
question. 
"* * * Suppose the county, after contracting 
for a new vault for the county clerk's office, should 
decide to dispose of the old furniture and pur-
chase new furniture for the courthouse. In deter-
mining whether the debt for the new vault ex-
ceeded the revenue and income for the year in 
which it was incurred, the salaries of the county 
officers for the entire year must be taken into 
consideration, for they are fixed charges which 
4 
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must be met at all hazard. But the debt sub-
sequently incurred for the new furniture should 
not be included for the debt is not indispensably 
necessary to the maintenance of the county gov-
ernment." 
How may respondent Spring City rely as it does up-
on the lack of evidence in the record to show that 1948 ex-
penditures were not "regular operating expenses" when 
the cases clearly hold that even regular operating ex-
penses subsequently incurred or paid may not invalidate 
a pre-existing valid debt? The burden of proof to show 
that required and fixed expenditures have, as of the time 
of assumption of a disputed debt, been in excess of rev-
enues for the current year is upon the defendant. Cer-
tainly on January 15th, the date of the issue now con-
sidered, expenditures for the year could not have ex-
ceeded potential revenues for that year, and the defend-
ant is required to affirmatively plead and prove any 
fixed charges which must be anticipated during the 
remainder of the year. Kule 8 (c) U.E.C.P. requires 
illegality, as an affirmative defense, to be pleaded as such. 
20 Am. Jur., p. 142, Evidence, Sec. 137 says: 
"As to affirmative defenses asserted by the 
defendant, he is the actor and hence must establish 
the allegations of such defenses." 
Sec. 143 at p. 149 of the same volume says: 
"The burden of proving illegality or inval-
idity is upon the party who alleges it. The law 
will not presume illegality in the execution of a 
contract or other document. Where the defendant 
confesses in effect the cause of action alleged by 
the plaintiff but seeks to avoid it by setting up 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
illegality or invalidity he has the burden of 
proving such defense." 
If, as the respondent implies, the record is silent 
on this matter, then the evidence does not support the 
findings and judgment of the lower court. 
We renew our argument that the critical factor in 
determining constitutional validity of bonds is the time 
the debt is created or assumed. On January 15th the 
"taxes for the current year" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 3 of Article XIV were still available for the satis-
faction of a debt such as the one here disputed. 
If the debt limit had not as of that time been ex-
ceeded, then by authority of Muir v. Murray City, 55 
Utah 368, 186 P. 433, it is immaterial that the time for 
payment was provided to be in a year or years subse-
quent. See also 159 A.L.K. at page 1267 (the italicized 
material on page 4 of this brief) to the same effect. 
In Tuggle v. City of Barbourville, 294 Ky. 351, 171 
S.W. 2d 1008, a floating indebtedness was adjudged to be 
valid under constitutional restrictions similar to those in 
this state. In that case, a city council was declared to 
have authority to fund city obligations, valid when cre-
ated, the satisfaction of which was prevented by a failure 
of current revenues to meet the city's necessary obliga-
tions created subsequent to and the debts which were 
funded. In that case the city ordinance passed September 
4, 1942, provided for the issuance of four percent (4%) 
bonds to the amount of $33,000.00, the last to mature in 
1962. The same constitutional objections were interposed 
to that issue as have been set up here by the defendant 
and respondent. In that case the court said : 
6 
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"The record shows that the indebtedness 
sought to be refunded was incurred for the pur-
poses and in the manner stated and that being 
valid obligations at the time within the purview 
of sections 157 and 158 of the constitution there 
is nothing * * * which would prevent a holding 
that the proposed issue is valid." 
For the court's consideration, a material portion of 
section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution provides: 
"No county, city, town, taxing district or 
other municipality shall be authorized or per-
mitted to become indebted in any manner or for 
any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year 
the income and revenue provided for such year 
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters 
thereof * * *." 
It must certainly be said that the improvements pro-
cured through the flotation of this disputed issue were 
necessary and required expenditures of the year. The 
express recitation in the authorizing proceedings stated 
that there was an "immediate, imperative and pressing 
need of raising funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the 
purpose of extending and improving the power and light 
plant to be owned and controlled by the city." The 
resolution further recited that "$12,000.00 may be raised 
at this time without incurring any indebtedness or lia-
bility by said city in excess of the revenue of said city 
for the current year 1948." (Plaintiff's Ex. B [resolu-
tion authorizing bonds] P. 2). Under the authority of 
Sections 10-8-2, 10-8-6 and 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, the city council had express power and authority 
to make all the material findings upon which that reci-
tation was based and to procure the flotation of indebt-
7 
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edness which is now disputed. If necessary obligations 
arising subsequent to that flotation had exhausted taxes 
and revenues anticipated, then under authority of the 
Tuggle case and the Muir case, supra, city officials would 
be entitled to float this indebtedness over to years sub-
sequent to the year in which incurred. 
Upon that basis we renew our argument that a dif-
ferent rule would demoralize presently valid and bind-
ing obligations known as tax anticipation notes or bonds, 
for this reason: that a tax anticipation note is valid if 
there are unexpended revenues or potential revenues 
available to meet it at the time the note was executed 
and delivered. Subsequent diversions could deprive the 
holder of the note or bond of his payment under a rule 
sought by the respondent. The holder has no lien, gar-
nishment or encumbrance upon taxes anticipated and 
could not protect himself by enjoining public officials 
from appropriating the taxes when collected for pur-
poses other than for the satisfaction of his claim. It is 
this type of diversion to which we most particularly 
object, a diversion impliedly covenanted against by the 
city officials of Spring City. 
2. If a portion of the bonds are declared invalid, plain-
tiff and appellant should have judgment for all bonds not 
in excess of the constitutional maximum. 
C. J.S., Vol. 64, P. 506, Sec. 1914 says : 
"Where the limit of indebtedness has not 
been previously reached, bonds which in the 
aggregate exceed the limit are void only to the 
extent of excessive issue." 
8 
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43 Am. Jur., P. 290, Public Securities and Obliga-
tions, Sec. 26, states: 
"It is well settled that an over-issue of bonds 
by a political subdivision—that is, where a por-
tion of the bonds, although not all of them, is in 
excess of the amount authorized or the debt limit 
—does not affect the validity of an entire issue 
of bonds but only those in excess of what is auth-
orized." 
If this court adopts the view that a bondholder is 
required to take notice of certain fixed charges which 
would cut down the borrowing power when that power 
is measured by current revenue, then we submit that 
there is nothing in the record which would show fixed 
charges which in the aggregate would cut down cur-
rent revenues to leave a tolerance of less than $13,498.67 
as of January 15th; and that as of that date Spring City 
officials had an autonomous borrowing potential of $13,-
498.67. The burden of showing the contrary is upon 
defendant and respondent. The record discloses that it 
has failed in this respect. However, in the event this 
court is of the opinion that fixed charges of which any 
purchaser or holder must take notice are shown by the 
record to have limited that borrowing power, then the 
case ought to be reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings for the purpose of determining to what extent, 
exactly, the sum of $13,498.67, added to those fixed 
charges, together with expenditures made between Janu-
ary 1st and 15th, had exceeded the revenues realized by 
Spring City in the year 1948. 64 C.J.S. P. 503, Municipal 
Corporations, Sec. 1911, provides: 
9 
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"Some statutory limitations refer only to the 
amount of bonds or stock which are issued at 
any one time or within any one fiscal year, but 
other charter or statutory limitations, by their 
express terms, or the constructions placed there-
on, are applicable to the aggregate bonded indebt-
edness of the municipality, or the aggregate 
amount of its outstanding stock. Whether a limi-
tation of bonded indebtedness is exceeded by a 
particular issue of bonds must be determined as 
of the time of the actual issuance of the bonds, 
and not as of a prior date when the bonds are 
authorized by popular vote, or a subsequent date, 
such as the date when the bonds are payable, or 
a date when the tax valuations are lower." 
The case most highly emphasized in respondent's 
brief of Fritch v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 15 Utah 82, 87 P. 1026, defines "debt" as being 
an obligation incurred during a year whether for goods 
or services or other expenses customarily to be incurred 
in the administration of government. Even under th<> 
Fritch case we fail to see how the constitutional provision 
"no debt in excess of taxes for the current year shall be 
created" could have any reference to existing indebted-
ness. Constitutional elements are to be construed as 
meaning that which the framers and individuals who 
drew and ratified the constitution believed and intended 
them to mean. In determining the meaning of specific 
provisions it is proper to consider the wording and 
phraseology of other related provisions contained in the 
same document and historically contemporary. It is to 
be noted that Section 4 of Article XIV, supplementing 
Section 3, places a maximum of debt with respect to 
10 
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"existing indebtedness." It is conceivable that a muni-
cipality might be authorized under Section 3 to borrow 
a sum greater than permitted by Section 4, and the 
purpose of Section 4 is to limit aggregate debt to a pei^ 
centage of taxable property values, in cutting down other 
authorizations. 
Clearly an obligation created in years past is not 
created in the year in which it or installments thereon 
are to be paid. To create a debt within the meaning of 
Section 3, Article XIV is to incur a liability, whether paid 
presently upon receipt of the goods or service, or pro-
tracted as to its satisfaction to future years. We do 
not feel, however, that a municipality may be said to have 
created a debt within the current year when in that year 
they do no more than make a payment upon existing in-
debtedness. Upon that hypothesis a municipality in any 
given year may, without a bond election, create debt equal 
to the revenues for that year, and revenues are not to be 
diminished by payments which are made upon prior exist-
ing indebtedness, for the reason that Section 3 places a 
maximum upon debts created within the year and Article 3 
of Section 14 does not contemplate existing debt. The 
framers of the constitution fixed a maximum of aggregate 
debt in the following section, Section 4. In the instant case 
the critical year of 1948 reflects payments upon existing 
debt of $9,725.68. In our opinion that amount should 
not be included as a "debt created in the current year" 
and that amount should not be a direct diminution of 
the amount fixed as a maximum by Section 3 of Article 
XIV for the creation of debt without bond elections. 
11 
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Particularly appropriate is this argument when the 
respondent in its brief at page 7, paragraph 1, even 
goes so far as to imply the illegality of some of the 
previous issues upon which installments were paid. In 
our original appeal brief we questioned the validity of 
a $5,000.00 "tax anticipation note" (page 16 of appeal 
brief) which was paid in the year 1948 and treated by 
the lower court as "debt created within the year" in 
cutting down the borrowing power of Spring Cily 
to that extent. We respectfully submit that the plaintiff 
and appellant ought to be given judgment in any event 
to the extent by which the revenues within the year 1948 
exceeded the expenditures of the year 1948, exclusive 
of $9,725.68 which was spent by the city on retirement 
of debt existing from previous years. 
Defendant and respondent has raised the question 
of failure to provide for the payment of interest upon 
the bonds and failure to provide a sinking fund for their 
retirement. C.J.S., Vol. 64, page 512, Municipal Cor-
porations, Section 1918, provides : 
"A municipal corporation may and sometimes 
must, prior to the issuance of bonds, make pro-
vision for the payment of such bonds and interest 
thereon; but in the absence of such requirement 
the failure to provide for the payment of interest 
and to create a sinking fund does not affect the 
legality of the bonds." 
We find no constitutional or statutory conditions 
precedent to the validity of bonds which would require 
the provision of a sinking fund or a provision for the 
payment of interest on the bonds, prior to issue. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary we respectfully contend that the bonds 
are valid in all respects, having been issued at a time 
when they, together with previously incurred liability 
within the year and fixed charges for the year, did not 
exceed anticipated revenues for the year. That having 
been valid when created, no subsequent action by Spring 
City could invalidate them, and that under the Muir 
case and Tuggle decision cited, provision could be made 
for their satisfaction in future years. 
We respectfully contend that if, after assumption of 
this debt, Spring City exceeded its revenues for 1948, 
then only the over-issue is void, and in computing the 
over-issue, no consideration should be given to fixed 
charges which consist of debts created in previous years. 
At this point we wish to renew the previous argu-
ments set forth in the original appeal brief in our con-
tention that if the bonds in whole or in part be declared 
void, then the plaintiff and appellant ought to recover 
upon quantum meruit 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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